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Faculty and employee ownership of inventions in Australia 
 
A recent decision by the Australian High Court means that, unless faculty are bound by an 
assignment or intellectual property (IP) policy, they may own inventions resulting from their 
research. 
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Thirty years after its introduction, the US Bayh-Dole Act, which vests ownership of employee 
inventions in the employer university or research organization, has become a model for 
commercialization around the world. In Australia, despite recommendations that a Bayh-Dole style 
regime be adopted, the recent decision in University of Western Australia (UWA) v Gray1 has 
moved the default legal position in a diametrically opposite direction. A key focus of the debate was 
whether faculty’s duty to carry out research also encompasses a duty to invent. Late last year, the 
Full Federal Court confirmed a lower court ruling that it does not, and this year the High Court 
refused leave to appeal (denied certiorari). Thus, Gray stands as Australia’s most faculty-friendly 
authority to date. 
 
The US common law position 
 
Absent an express written agreement assigning the rights in faculty inventions to a university, or a 
legally binding faculty handbook or university intellectual property (IP) policy, the common law 
position on ownership of faculty and other employees inventions remains unclear.  The usual 
starting point is the US Supreme Court’s decision in Standard Parts Co v Peck, which states that an 
employer owns employees’ inventions if the employee was ‘hired to invent’.  Under the later 
Dubilier Condenser case, if the employment was merely ‘general’, then even if the invention is in 
the employee’s field, and relevant to the employer’s business, and even if it was developed on the 
employer’s time and/or with the employer’s resources, the employee owns.  The employer gets a 
shop right as compensation – an irrevocable, royalty-free, non-exclusive, largely non-transferable, 
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implied license to use the invention.  If the employment was general and no employer time or 
resources were used, the employee owns all rights unencumbered. 
 Whether an employee was hired to invent often depends on the specificity of the 
task delegated by the employer. Generally, being engaged to do research or improve products is 
insufficient – if courts were too ready to vest ownership in the employer, inventive creativity might 
be discouraged2. Thus, the employee must be hired to invent the invention at issue; if hired to invent 
A, they will not lose the right to invention B. 
 In the university context, despite increasing commercialization, most researchers 
are still not explicitly hired to invent for the university’s commercial gain. The core of ‘public 
good’ still lingers, and the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake has yet to disappear. The difficulty 
lies in deciding whether a faculty’s duty to research encompasses a duty to invent. 
 Those arguing in the positive invariably cite the Speck case. Speck, a professor 
and researcher at North Carolina State University, developed a process for producing a sweet-
tasting acidophilus milk. He successfully drove efforts to have the milk mass produced, but the 
university refused to pay him anything out of its licensing royalties.  Speck sued, and the case 
turned on whether he could show he had a property interest in the process.  The North Carolina 
Supreme Court found that Speck was hired to invent, so he had no rights in the process.  Proponents 
of Speck usually argue that the Houghton case lends further substance to the proposition that 
researchers are hired to invent: 
 Let a case be supposed of a charitable foundation, which employs chemists and 
physicians to study diseases, with a view of discovering a cure for them, one of whose employees, in the 
course of experiments conducted for it, discovers a remedy which it is seeking, and for the discovery of 
which the experiments are conducted, and procures a patent on it. Should such employee be allowed to 
withhold the patent from the foundation for his own profit, merely because the foundation does not desire to 
monopolize the remedy but to give the benefit of the discovery to mankind?…To ask such a question is to 
answer it …3 
 However, the Houghton case involved a chemist expressly directed to develop a 
particular fumigant, and the court was merely dispelling the argument that the hired-to-invent 
doctrine would not apply if the employer were disinterested in patenting.  In addition, many 
commentators have criticized Speck, particularly because the court considered Speck’s use of the 
university’s time and resources as a factor indicating he was hired to invent, rather than, as settled 
case law indicates, a factor indicating a shop right should be awarded.  Also, while the university 
‘permitted and encouraged’ the research, there was no evidence Speck’s research agenda was 
controlled by his department or the university; it was ‘motivated simply by his scientific curiosity.’4 
Some have opined the policy signals Speck sends: if faculty are hired to invent, how does this sit 
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with the usual notions of academic freedom?5 This is the precise question the Australian courts 
grappled with, as discussed below. 
 
The position under Bayh-Dole 
 
Given the uncertainty in US common law, the passage of the Bayh-Doyle Act in 1980 was a 
welcome (for some) introduction of an overriding standard for determining ownership of inventions 
created with the use of federal research funds.  The Act aims to promote the commercialization of 
inventions by allowing universities and other recipients of federal research funds to elect to take 
title to subject inventions if they agree to file a timely patent application.  The university must then 
retain title to the inventions, share licensing proceeds with the employee inventors and the balance 
of licensing income must be used to support scientific research or education. 
 Against the backdrop of Bayh-Dole, most universities have in recent times 
adopted a ‘belts and braces’ approach, by issuing IP policies that vest ownership of faculty 
inventions in the university, and by requiring that faculty sign invention assignment agreements 
(either as a condition of employment or as a belated attempt to stitch up the ownership question). A 
fundamental tenet of contract law is that parties are free to enter bargains as they see fit. 
Consequently, where faculty assign inventions, it is assumed that this has been compensated by the 
payment of wages.  So courts have upheld assignments over objections they are unconscionable, 
coerced under duress, where the university has paid as little as $1, or where continued employment 
is the only consideration6. 
 However, although the arrangement under Bayh-Dole has recently garnered 
support7, there is a growing body of agitators for faculty ownership. In an early article, Chew8 
argues that, in fact, university ownership is not legally required by Bayh-Dole. Faculty ownership 
would allow universities to maintain their academic mission and primacy of basic research.  It 
would also enhance faculty creativity.  Universities, Chew argues, would not lose significant 
revenue as royalty income represents a relatively minor part of most university funding.  In any 
event, she suggests that university technology transfer offices (TTOs) could negotiate a percentage 
of royalty income in return for marketing faculty inventions, and that this could offset losses 
incurred.  Similar arrangements are proposed by Kulkarni9 and Smith10. 
 More recently, Clements uses law and economics to argue that Bayh-Dole’s 
impact has been marginalized by the practicalities of implementation: refusals to disclose 
inventions, difficulties of technology transfer due to information asymmetries and deadweight 
losses caused by exclusive licenses. He argues that faculty ownership could be achieved by 
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amendments to the Act and, possibly, by courts’ refusals to uphold assignment agreements. Like 
Chew, Clements argues that universities would not forego significant revenue as universities’ 
income from licensing is proportionately small compared to other revenue sources. It would remove 
at least part of the perceived issue with publication delay and secrecy because many ‘archetypal 
academic scientists’ who ‘hate the Act’ would choose to publish rather than patent. It would also 
reverse the effect of the Act ‘steer[ing] research down less interesting avenues’ because faculty that 
chose to publish rather than patent would channel their efforts toward more basic research11. 
 Kenney and Patton similarly argue that university ownership is not optimal either 
in terms of economic efficiency or advancing the social interest of rapidly commercializing 
technology and encouraging entrepreneurship. Under faculty ownership, the inventor would be the 
principal and they could choose their agent (TTO); TTOs would thus be forced to become more 
competitive.  Faculty ownership would shrink the gray market in faculty inventions – in one study, 
over 20% of professors had founded firms without university licenses; in another, 42% of 
professors that patented did so without informing the TTO12. 
 Nevertheless, Kenney and Patton candidly acknowledge that faculty ownership 
brings its own problems, including the obvious rejoinder to Clements that, in fact, problems with 
secrecy and non-disclosure may be exacerbated by the faculty’s increased stake in the rewards of 
patenting.  Further, there is a risk that some inventions would not be commercialized, and that some 
inventors may be incompetent at commercialization—but they maintain that this decentralized 
ineptitude is better than, as at present, the centralized ineptitude of many TTOs that affects all 
university inventors. 
 However, Kenney and Patton also point to a significant detriment of faculty 
ownership for which they offer no remedy: it could discourage collaborative research, particularly 
large-scale multi-institutional collaborative research, since the large number of co-owners makes 
logistics extremely difficult. As Bruun explains, the fragmented ownership problem faced by large-
scale collaborative projects was in fact one of the main reasons that Finland followed other 
European countries and abolished the ‘teacher exception’ (faculty ownership) in 2007 and adopted 
Bayh-Dole-like reforms13. 
 For every commentator applauding Bayh-Dole, there are others now querying its 
efficacy.  It does not look like the debate will settle any time soon.  In the meantime, proselytizing 
aside, for most US academics it’s business as usual: contractual arrangements are likely to be 
binding and will decide the ownership issue in the university’s favour. 
 
The UWA versus Gray case 
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In Australia, employers derive ownership rights under §15(1)(b) of the Patents Act. This states that 
employers “would, on the grant of a patent … be entitled to have the patent assigned” to them. 
Entitlement to assignment is determined by a common law principle established by the English case 
of Sterling Engineering v Patchett which (like the US Supreme Court’s decision on Standard Parts 
and Dubilier) dictates that an employer will own where an employee, in the course of their 
employment, makes an invention which it was their duty to make. 
The question of whether Australian faculty were hired to invent was, until UWA v Gray, left 
unclear. Some thought the question depended on the discipline, and whether the research might 
yield an invention. For example, if research into diabetes could result in an invention, it was thought 
the duty to research might encompass a duty to invent.  
The key protagonist in the case, Bruce Gray, was first employed at Melbourne University in 
the early 1980s, where he initiated research into the treatment of liver cancer by selectively 
delivering anti-cancer therapies to tumor sites. The University of Western Australia (UWA) 
subsequently employed Gray from 1985 to teach and “undertake research and to organize and 
generally stimulate research among the staff and students”. He continued in the same line of 
research, and after patenting various inventions, Gray assigned his IP to his commercialization 
company Sirtex Medical (Lane Cove, New South Wales, Australia). Sirtex went on to float on the 
Australian Stock Exchange and its current market capitalization is more than AUS$275 million. It is 
now one of Australia’s largest biotech companies. 
Gray’s employment contract referred to the UWA Statutes and Regulations, which included 
Patents Regulations and, later, IP Regulations. However, the earlier Regulations did not vest IP 
rights in faculty inventions in UWA; they merely assumed the university had such rights. The later 
Regulations did purport to vest ownership in UWA, but the trial judge and Court of Appeal held 
these Regulations invalid – the Act establishing the University did not allow the Senate to make 
regulations divesting its faculty’s IP rights. So the invalid Regulations could not be incorporated 
into Gray’s contractual terms. An additional problem was that the Regulations had not been 
properly promulgated and so were not effective until after Gray’s employment at UWA had 
fundamentally changed. 
So UWA was thrown back on its common law position. It argued that Gray’s contract was 
subject to a term, implied by law, that he must assign ownership of any inventions to the University.  
Assignment was said to be required wherever an employee is engaged, instructed or authorised to 
solve technical problems, improve the employer’s technology, or undertake research, from which 
such invention may arise.  
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The Australian ruling 
 
The Appeals court, like the trial judge, found that the university/faculty relationship raised such 
distinctive considerations that it was inappropriate to accept that there is a general presumption that 
a university will own inventions developed in the course of its faculty’s research.  Gray’s 
circumstances of employment also weighed against implication of the term. In particular: 
 
(a) Gray was not under any (express) duty to invent anything. Consistently with traditional notions 
of academic freedom, Gray was free to choose his line of research and the manner of its pursuit. 
 
(b) Gray was free to publish his research results and any inventions developed, notwithstanding this 
might destroy patentability of any inventions. The fact that UWA did not impose any obligations of 
secrecy was also consistent with traditional notions of academic freedom, and inconsistent with an 
intention by UWA to own and commercialize faculty inventions. The Court of Appeal considered 
the importance of the freedom to publish was ‘self-evident.’ Implication of a term as posited by 
UWA would have a ‘significant collateral impact’ on academics if it were underpinned by a 
corresponding duty not to disclose. 
 
(c) Gray expended much time and effort applying for external funds.  As with many cash-strapped 
universities UWA wanted to foster, but could not fund, Gray’s research. Unlike the general 
employer/employee scenario where the employer has funded the employee’s work, if UWA’s term 
were implied, it would ‘allow UWA to reap where various entities had sown.’ 
 
(d) Gray engaged in significant collaborative work with external organisations.  The need for inter-
institutional cooperation weighed against exclusive appropriation of the end product by one 
institution via an implied term.  In addition, the evidence on information exchanges in Gray’s field 
of research demonstrated that sharing of research results, and know-how, was both necessary and 
accepted – which further told against implication of the term. 
 
Ultimately, UWA was unsuccessful on all counts. In what might seem the final legal snub, 
Australian law has yet to recognize the existence of a shop right, so UWA was left without any 
rights whatsoever to Gray’s inventions. As the High Court drily remarked in refusing leave to 
appeal, the case emphasizes the need for express contractual arrangements on ownership.  
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However, it didn’t all go well for Gray. Sirtex successfully cross-claimed against him for 
breach of his directors’ duties and for misleading and deceptive conduct (for failing to inform the 
company about the potential ownership problems), resulting in an order for Gray to pay it almost 
AUS$2 million. 
 
The aftermath 
So the common law position on faculty ownership in Australia seems to have been resolved, for the 
moment, in favor of faculty. Not surprisingly, Gray ignited a rash of university soul-searching, 
where the implications of faculty ownership and how best to secure university ownership, were 
pondered. Yet the Gray case is in many respects an unsatisfactory precedent and there is certainly 
an array of very particular facts and circumstances that will allow later courts to sidestep it and 
discount it as an all-embracing authority. 
Nevertheless Gray’s emergence on the legal landscape will likely lead to renewed calls for 
tailored statutory intervention. Christie et al.15 raise the usual arguments:  
 The default position should not vest ownership of patents in employee inventors nor funding 
agencies. This is because employees may not recognize the commercial value of their inventions 
and because of the potential problems with fragmentation of ownership. Indeed, experience in 
Canada has shown that academic staff members in universities often lack the time and expertise 
required for commercialisation. Funding agencies are also not well placed to assume ownership 
rights, as they are one step removed from the inventive process… 
There is little doubt that Bayh-Dole has gone a considerable distance towards clarifying title 
for research with federal funding links.  It means that, like the hamster bite that kills, the uncertainty 
of the common law is rarely a problem (but when it is, it can still be ugly).  However it must be 
acknowledged that a spectrum of issues – from capturing ownership outside the Act, through to 
how it might best be overhauled to mitigate a host of anticompetitive byproducts – continues to 
raise concerns. 
So although arguments can be assembled in favour of a Bayh-Dole-styled approach being 
adopted in Australia, as always a careful balancing process should be followed. On the one hand, a 
new statute will inevitably limit future flexibility and interfere with private contracting rights.  On 
the other, given the vexed issue of ownership and the complications of Gray, the answer is probably 
that some form of statutory clarification is justified.  Whether legislation like Bayh-Dole would 
have a good fit with the Australian research landscape is another matter.  
The Australian Productivity Commission (LOCATION?) recently urged a “cautious” 
approach to adopting an Australian Bayh-Dole Act. Although Bayh-Dole was introduced in 
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response to concerns that many university inventions were not being commercialized, there is little 
evidence of a similar phenomenon in Australia. The Commission found there were already financial 
incentives for Australian universities to commercialize—such as the one third royalty sharing 
arrangement most commonly struck between universities, inventors and the inventors’ departments.  
The Commission also pointed out the potential for new Bayh-Dole-styled legislation to adversely 
impact on the incentives operating within universities—suggesting the delicate balance between 
commercialization activities and the ‘academic traditions of openness and curiosity driven research’ 
may be disrupted16. 
For now, Australian inventors and researchers are left with Gray, and the prospects of Bayh-
Dole reforms appear to be slim to none in the immediately foreseeable political future. For those 
few faculty members or researchers at other institutions who, through good luck or good 
management are not bound to contractual assignments, the decision is a windfall. For most 
Australian faculty, as in the US, contract will usually reign supreme and universities will usually 
win the ownership tug-of-war. Nevertheless, the Gray decision is a salient reminder that the issue of 
ownership can never be underestimated for its ability to provoke a good fight. 
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